History of China/Chapter 31

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History of China

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Chapter 31: Ethnicity, Frontier, and the Making of "China"

1. Introduction: What Is "China"?

The question of what "China" is — where its boundaries lie, who its people are, and what holds it together as a political and cultural entity — is one of the most fundamental and contested questions in Chinese history. The answer has never been simple, and it has changed dramatically over time. The "China" of the Shang dynasty was a small cluster of settlements in the Yellow River valley. The "China" of the Han dynasty was a vast agrarian empire stretching from the Pacific coast to the Tarim Basin. The "China" of the Qing dynasty was a multiethnic empire of continental dimensions, encompassing Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan as well as the "China proper" (中国本部, Zhongguo benbu) of the eighteen provinces. And the "China" of the People's Republic is a state that claims sovereignty over all the territory of the Qing empire (minus Mongolia) and that defines its population as a unified "Chinese nation" (中华民族, Zhonghua minzu) comprising fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups.

This chapter examines the history of ethnicity, frontier, and identity in China — the processes through which the boundaries of "China" were drawn and redrawn, the relationships between the Han majority and the many non-Han peoples who have lived within and alongside the Chinese state, and the intellectual and political debates about what it means to be "Chinese." It is a story that challenges the common assumption that China is and always has been a unified, homogeneous civilization — revealing instead a complex, multiethnic, and often contested history in which the meaning of "China" has been continuously negotiated and redefined.

The significance of this history extends far beyond the academy. The claims of the People's Republic to sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang, its policy toward the Uyghur and Tibetan populations, its assertion that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China, and its promotion of a unified "Chinese" identity are all grounded in particular readings of the historical relationship between ethnicity, territory, and nationhood. Understanding the history of these relationships is essential to evaluating these claims — and to understanding the political dynamics that shape some of the most consequential issues in contemporary international affairs.

2. The Han: Construction of a Majority

The Han Chinese (汉族, Hanzu) — who today constitute approximately 92 percent of the population of the People's Republic — are often treated as a natural, self-evident category: the "Chinese" people, the core population of Chinese civilization. But the concept of "Han" as an ethnic identity is, in fact, a relatively recent construction — one that emerged gradually over the course of Chinese history and that was given its modern form only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, under the influence of Western concepts of race and nationhood.

The term "Han" derives from the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), one of the most successful and culturally influential dynasties in Chinese history, whose name became associated with the Chinese people in the way that "Roman" became associated with the peoples of the Roman Empire. But the population of the Han dynasty was itself diverse — comprising peoples of varying origins, languages, and cultures who had been incorporated into the empire through conquest, migration, and assimilation. The process by which this diverse population came to see itself as a single "Han" people was gradual, uneven, and never complete — and it involved the continuous absorption and assimilation of non-Han peoples as well as the exclusion and marginalization of those who could not or would not be assimilated.

The boundaries of "Han" identity have shifted over time. Peoples who were once considered "barbarians" (蛮夷, manyi) — including many of the populations of southern China — were gradually sinicized through Chinese colonization, intermarriage, the adoption of Chinese language and customs, and the extension of Chinese administrative control. The process of "becoming Han" was not primarily biological but cultural — it involved the adoption of Chinese language, dress, customs, and (most importantly) the Confucian values and practices that defined membership in Chinese civilization. The Confucian concept of hua (华, "civilized") versus yi (夷, "barbarian") was cultural rather than racial — anyone who adopted Chinese civilization was, in principle, "Chinese," regardless of ethnic origin.

This cultural definition of Chinese identity coexisted uneasily with a more racial or ethnic understanding. The Mongol and Manchu conquests provoked intense reflection on the boundaries of "Chinese" identity — since these conquest dynasties were, by any definition, ruled by non-Han peoples, the question of whether they could be considered "Chinese" dynasties was deeply contested. The anti-Manchu sentiment that fueled the revolutionary movement of the late Qing — epitomized by the slogan "expel the Manchu barbarians, restore the Chinese" (驱除鞑虏，恢复中华, quchu dalu, huifu Zhonghua) — drew on a racial understanding of Chinese identity that defined the Manchus as foreign invaders and the Han as the authentic Chinese nation.

The resolution of this tension — between a cultural understanding of Chinese identity that could encompass non-Han peoples and a racial understanding that defined the Han as the true Chinese — has been one of the central problems of modern Chinese nationalism. Sun Yat-sen's "five races under one republic" (五族共和, wuzu gonghe) — which defined the Chinese nation as comprising the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Hui (Muslim) peoples — represented an attempt to create an inclusive national identity, but one that was in practice dominated by the Han majority. The PRC's classification of the Chinese population into fifty-six "nationalities" (民族, minzu) — with the Han as the majority and fifty-five "minority nationalities" (少数民族, shaoshu minzu) — institutionalized this tension in a framework that recognized diversity while asserting the unity of the "Chinese nation."

3. The Northern Frontier: China and the Steppe

The relationship between the agricultural civilization of China and the pastoral peoples of the Eurasian steppe — the great grasslands stretching from Manchuria through Mongolia to Central Asia — has been one of the most enduring and consequential themes in Chinese history. For over two millennia, the northern frontier was China's most important and most dangerous border — the zone of contact, conflict, and exchange between the sedentary Chinese world and the mobile, militarily formidable nomadic societies of the steppe.

The earliest recorded confrontation between China and the steppe peoples involved the Xiongnu (匈奴) — a powerful nomadic confederation that dominated the eastern steppe from the third century BCE to the first century CE. The threat of the Xiongnu prompted the Qin dynasty's construction of the Great Wall (长城, Changcheng) — the most famous frontier defense in world history — and the Han dynasty's adoption of a variety of strategies for managing the steppe threat, including military campaigns, marriage alliances (heqin), trade agreements, and the payment of tribute. The relationship between Han China and the Xiongnu — and between subsequent Chinese dynasties and their steppe neighbors — was never simply one of conflict; it involved complex patterns of trade, diplomacy, cultural exchange, and mutual influence that shaped both Chinese and steppe civilizations.

The great steppe empires that rose and fell on China's northern frontier — the Xiongnu, the Xianbei, the Turks, the Khitan, the Jurchen, and the Mongols — were not mere "barbarian" threats to be repelled but sophisticated political entities with their own state structures, military organizations, cultural traditions, and diplomatic strategies. The Khitan Liao dynasty (907–1125) and the Jurchen Jin dynasty (1115–1234) conquered and ruled northern China for extended periods, creating hybrid states that combined steppe military traditions with Chinese administrative practices. The Mongol Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) conquered all of China, creating the largest contiguous empire in world history. And the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1912) — the last and most successful of the conquest dynasties — ruled China for nearly three centuries, creating the territorial framework of the modern Chinese state.

The significance of the steppe frontier for Chinese history cannot be overstated. It was the principal driver of Chinese military development — from the Great Wall to the banner system of the Qing. It was a major source of cultural exchange — Buddhism entered China via the Silk Road, which traversed the steppe; the stirrup, the composite bow, and many other technologies were transmitted between steppe and Chinese civilizations. And it was the origin of the political units — Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet, and Xinjiang — whose incorporation into the Qing empire created the territorial boundaries of modern China.

The "New Qing History" (新清史, Xin Qingshi) — a scholarly movement that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s, associated with historians like Mark Elliott, Pamela Crossley, and Evelyn Rawski — has fundamentally reframed the history of the Qing dynasty by emphasizing its Inner Asian dimensions. The New Qing historians argue that the Qing was not simply a "Chinese" dynasty that happened to be ruled by Manchus, but a multiethnic, multilingual empire that governed its diverse populations through different institutional mechanisms — using Chinese bureaucratic methods in China proper, Mongol-style political relationships in Mongolia, the incarnation system and patron-priest relationship in Tibet, and military-administrative structures in Xinjiang. This interpretation has been deeply controversial in China, where it is seen by some as challenging the narrative of Chinese national unity and providing ammunition for separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang.

4. Tibet: The Roof of the World and the Weight of History

Tibet (西藏, Xizang) — the vast, high-altitude plateau in China's southwest — occupies a unique position in Chinese history and in the contemporary imagination. For the Chinese government, Tibet is an integral part of China that has been under Chinese sovereignty since at least the Yuan dynasty (thirteenth century). For the Tibetan exile community and many international observers, Tibet is a historically independent nation that was conquered and annexed by Communist China in 1950–1951. The truth, as with most historical questions, is more complex than either of these positions suggests.

The Tibetan Empire of the seventh through ninth centuries was a major power in Central Asia — a military force that conquered the Tang capital of Chang'an in 763 and that controlled vast territories stretching from the Tarim Basin to Nepal. The relationship between Tibet and China during this period was one of rivalry and occasional alliance, conducted between two sovereign states that recognized each other as equals.

The Mongol Yuan dynasty established a distinctive relationship with Tibet — the "patron-priest" (施主-上师, shizhu-shangshi) relationship, in which the Mongol khans served as political patrons and the Tibetan Buddhist lamas served as spiritual preceptors. This relationship provided a framework for Mongol (and later Qing) authority over Tibet that was qualitatively different from the bureaucratic administration that governed China proper. The Qing dynasty exercised varying degrees of control over Tibet from the eighteenth century onward — installing a resident commissioner (驻藏大臣, Zhu-Zang dachen, known as the "Amban") in Lhasa and intervening militarily on several occasions — but the degree of Chinese control fluctuated, and Tibet maintained a substantial degree of internal autonomy.

During the period of Chinese weakness in the early twentieth century — the fall of the Qing, the warlord era, and the Japanese invasion — Tibet functioned as a de facto independent state, with its own government, army, currency, and foreign relations. This period of effective independence (1913–1950) is the basis for the Tibetan exile community's claim that Tibet was an independent nation that was illegally occupied by Communist China.

The People's Liberation Army entered Tibet in October 1950, and the "Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was signed in May 1951 under duress by representatives of the Tibetan government. The agreement provided for Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while guaranteeing the preservation of the existing political system and the status of the Dalai Lama. These guarantees were progressively violated, leading to the Tibetan uprising of March 1959, the flight of the fourteenth Dalai Lama to India, and the imposition of direct Chinese control.

The subsequent history of Tibet under Chinese rule has been characterized by episodes of severe repression — including the destruction of monasteries and the persecution of Buddhist clergy during the Cultural Revolution — alternating with periods of relative liberalization. The reform era brought economic development and improved living standards but also continued restrictions on religious practice, political expression, and cultural autonomy. The Dalai Lama's "Middle Way" approach — seeking genuine autonomy within the PRC rather than full independence — has been rejected by Beijing, which regards any compromise on sovereignty as unacceptable. The question of Tibet's future — and the fate of Tibetan culture and identity under Chinese rule — remains one of the most sensitive and consequential issues in Chinese politics.

5. Xinjiang: The "New Frontier" and Its Peoples

Xinjiang (新疆, literally "New Frontier") — the vast territory in China's northwest, comprising deserts, mountains, and oases — has been one of the most contested and strategically important regions in Chinese history. Home to the Uyghurs (维吾尔族, Weiwuer zu) — a Turkic, predominantly Muslim people who constitute approximately 45 percent of the region's population — and to other Turkic and Mongol peoples, Xinjiang represents the intersection of Chinese, Central Asian, and Islamic civilizations.

The history of Chinese control over Xinjiang has been intermittent and contested. The Han dynasty established military garrisons in the region (which it called the "Western Regions," 西域, Xiyu) in the second century BCE, but Chinese control was repeatedly lost and regained over the following centuries. The Tang dynasty exercised control over parts of the region in the seventh and eighth centuries, until the Battle of Talas (751) against the Abbasid Caliphate and the subsequent An Lushan Rebellion ended Chinese influence in Central Asia for centuries.

The Qing dynasty conquered Xinjiang in the 1750s — incorporating it into the empire through a series of military campaigns that destroyed the Dzungar Mongol state and established Chinese control over the oasis cities of the Tarim Basin and the grasslands of Dzungaria. The Qing administered Xinjiang through a military system that was distinct from the bureaucratic administration of China proper, and the region's population — predominantly Turkic Muslim — maintained its own language, culture, and religious practices under Chinese overlordship. The region was formally made a province in 1884, following the reconquest of Xinjiang by Zuo Zongtang after the rebellion of Yakub Beg.

The twentieth century saw repeated challenges to Chinese control — including two short-lived "East Turkestan Republics" (in 1933–1934 and 1944–1949) that reflected the aspiration of Uyghur and other Turkic peoples for self-determination. The People's Republic reestablished firm Chinese control after 1949, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region was established in 1955.

The reform era brought economic development and increased Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang — the Han proportion of the population grew from approximately 6 percent in 1949 to over 40 percent by the 2020s, largely through state-sponsored settlement programs. The economic benefits of development have been unevenly distributed, with Han settlers and state-owned enterprises capturing a disproportionate share, and the Uyghur population experiencing cultural marginalization, religious restrictions, and political exclusion.

The situation in Xinjiang has become a major international controversy since 2017, when reports emerged of the mass internment of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in what the Chinese government describes as "vocational education and training centers" and what critics describe as concentration camps. International investigations — based on leaked government documents, satellite imagery, and the testimony of former detainees — have documented the detention of an estimated one to two million people, the systematic suppression of Uyghur language and culture, the destruction of mosques and religious sites, and a comprehensive system of surveillance and control. The Chinese government maintains that its policies are necessary counterterrorism and deradicalization measures; many foreign governments, international organizations, and human rights groups have characterized them as crimes against humanity or genocide. The Xinjiang issue has become one of the most contentious points of friction in China's relations with the West and a test case for the international community's willingness to challenge China on human rights grounds.

6. The Southwestern Frontier: Diversity and Assimilation

The southwestern frontier of China — encompassing the provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangxi, and parts of Sichuan and Hunan — is one of the most ethnically diverse regions in the world, home to dozens of distinct ethnic groups, each with its own language, culture, and historical traditions. The history of the southwestern frontier is a story of gradual Chinese colonization, cultural exchange, and the complex processes of assimilation and resistance through which the region was incorporated into the Chinese state.

The incorporation of the southwest into the Chinese empire was a process that took centuries. During the Tang and Song dynasties, much of the region was governed by independent or semi-independent native states — most notably the Nanzhao kingdom (738–902) and its successor, the Dali kingdom (937–1253), in what is now Yunnan. These states were culturally and politically distinct from China proper, maintaining their own languages, religions, and political institutions while engaging in diplomatic and commercial relations with the Chinese empire.

The Mongol conquest of the Dali kingdom in 1253 brought Yunnan under the control of the Yuan dynasty, and the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties progressively extended Chinese administrative control over the region through a combination of military conquest, the establishment of Chinese-style administrative units, the promotion of Chinese settlement, and the gradual replacement of native chieftains (土司, tusi) with Chinese-appointed officials — a process known as gaitu guiliu (改土归流, "replacing native [chieftains] with regular [officials]").

The result was a layered society in which Han Chinese settlers — concentrated in the lowland valleys and urban centers — coexisted with indigenous peoples who occupied the hills, mountains, and more remote areas. The process of sinicization was uneven — some groups, such as the Zhuang of Guangxi (who are today China's largest minority nationality, with over 16 million members), became heavily assimilated, adopting Chinese language and customs while maintaining elements of their own identity. Others, such as the Miao (Hmong), the Yi (Lolo), the Dai (Thai), the Naxi, and the Tibeto-Burman peoples of the western highlands, maintained more distinctive identities, though all were affected to varying degrees by Chinese influence.

The ethnic diversity of the southwest made it a laboratory for the PRC's nationality policies. The Ethnic Classification Project (民族识别, minzu shibie) of the 1950s — in which teams of ethnologists, linguists, and administrators were sent to survey the population and assign each group an official ethnic classification — was one of the most ambitious exercises in social engineering in modern history. The project identified 55 minority nationalities — a number that was the result of political negotiation and scholarly judgment, and that grouped together peoples who, in many cases, did not consider themselves to be a single ethnic group. The classification system — and the policies of "autonomous regions," preferential treatment in education and family planning, and cultural preservation that accompanied it — has been the framework for minority policy in China ever since.

7. The "Zhonghua Minzu": Constructing the Chinese Nation

The concept of the "Chinese nation" (中华民族, Zhonghua minzu) — the idea that all the peoples within China's borders constitute a single national community — is one of the most important and most contested constructions in modern Chinese political thought. It is a concept that attempts to reconcile China's ethnic diversity with the imperative of national unity — to create a single "nation" out of the fifty-six officially recognized ethnic groups — and its development reflects the broader tensions between universalism and particularism, unity and diversity, that have characterized Chinese nationalism since its emergence in the late nineteenth century.

The concept has its origins in the work of Liang Qichao (梁启超), the influential reformer and public intellectual who, in the early twentieth century, sought to create a Chinese national identity that could serve as the basis for a modern nation-state. Liang's concept of the Zhonghua minzu was consciously inclusive — it encompassed not only the Han but all the peoples within China's borders, and it was intended to serve as a unifying identity that could transcend ethnic, linguistic, and regional differences.

The tension between this inclusive concept and the reality of Han dominance has been a persistent feature of Chinese nationalism. Sun Yat-sen's "five races" formulation — and his subsequent shift toward a more assimilationist position that envisioned the absorption of minority peoples into a single Chinese nation — reflected this tension. The Chinese Communist Party adopted the Soviet model of nationality policy, recognizing the existence of distinct minority nationalities and establishing "autonomous regions" in areas with significant minority populations. But the CCP's ultimate goal — the "great unity" (大团结, da tuanjie) of the Chinese nation — has always implied the eventual assimilation of minority peoples into a single national identity dominated by Han culture.

Under Xi Jinping, the emphasis on "Zhonghua minzu" as a unified, indivisible national identity has intensified. The policy of "ethnic mingling" (民族交融, minzu jiaorong) — which promotes the mixing of ethnic groups through education, migration, and intermarriage — reflects an assimilationist agenda that many minority intellectuals and international observers view with alarm. The situation in Xinjiang — where the policies of mass detention, cultural suppression, and demographic engineering have been described as an attempt to erase Uyghur identity — represents the most extreme manifestation of this agenda.

The debate over the meaning and boundaries of "Chinese" identity is not merely academic — it has profound implications for the rights and futures of tens of millions of people. Whether the "Chinese nation" is understood as a genuinely multiethnic community in which diverse cultures and identities are respected and protected, or as a vehicle for Han cultural dominance and the assimilation of non-Han peoples, will determine the character of the Chinese state and the experience of its minority populations for generations to come.

8. The "New Qing History" Debate

The "New Qing History" — the scholarly movement that has reinterpreted the Qing dynasty as a multiethnic, Inner Asian empire rather than simply a "Chinese" dynasty — has generated one of the most significant and contentious historiographical debates in the contemporary study of China. The implications of this debate extend far beyond the academy, touching on fundamental questions of national identity, territorial sovereignty, and the legitimacy of the Chinese state's claims to its frontier regions.

The New Qing historians — including Mark Elliott, Pamela Crossley, Evelyn Rawski, James Millward, and others — have argued that the Qing empire was qualitatively different from earlier Chinese dynasties in its scale, its ethnic composition, and its governing structures. The Qing rulers, they argue, were not simply Manchus who became Chinese but rulers of a multiethnic empire who maintained distinct identities and governing strategies for each of the empire's component peoples — using Manchu language and institutions to govern the Manchu banners, Mongol political traditions to manage Mongolia, Tibetan Buddhist institutions to govern Tibet, and Chinese bureaucratic methods to administer China proper. This "simultaneous" or "polyglot" mode of governance, they argue, was the key to the Qing's success in creating an empire far larger and more diverse than any previous Chinese dynasty.

The New Qing History has been vigorously contested by Chinese scholars, many of whom see it as politically motivated — an attempt to delegitimize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, Xinjiang, and other frontier regions by arguing that these areas were never truly "Chinese" but were merely components of a multiethnic empire that happened to be headquartered in Beijing. Chinese critics argue that the New Qing History exaggerates the distinctiveness of the Qing and underestimates the degree to which the Manchu rulers adopted Chinese culture, institutions, and identity. They contend that the territorial boundaries of the Qing empire are the legitimate basis for the territorial claims of the modern Chinese state, and that the emphasis on the empire's multiethnic character is a threat to national unity.

The debate has implications that extend beyond the Qing. At its core, it is a debate about the nature of "China" itself — whether China is best understood as a continuous, unified civilization centered on the Han Chinese and their culture, or as a more complex, contingent, and multiethnic entity whose territorial and cultural boundaries have been shaped by the specific historical circumstances of each era. This is not merely a question of historical interpretation — it is a question with profound political consequences, touching on the legitimacy of the Chinese state, the rights of minority peoples, and the future of some of the most contested territories on earth.

9. Minority Policies: Autonomy, Assimilation, and Resistance

The People's Republic of China's policies toward its minority nationalities have evolved significantly since 1949 — from the initial adoption of the Soviet model of ethnic autonomy, through the radical assimilationism of the Maoist era, to the more nuanced (but still contested) approaches of the reform period and the increasingly assimilationist policies of the Xi Jinping era.

The system of "ethnic regional autonomy" (民族区域自治, minzu quyu zizhi) — established in the 1950s and codified in the 1984 Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy — provides for the establishment of autonomous regions, prefectures, and counties in areas where minority nationalities constitute a significant portion of the population. Five provincial-level autonomous regions — Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, Guangxi, and Ningxia — and numerous autonomous prefectures and counties have been established. In theory, these autonomous areas enjoy special rights including the use of minority languages in government and education, the preservation of minority cultures, and preferential policies in areas such as family planning and university admissions.

In practice, the degree of genuine autonomy enjoyed by minority regions has been limited. The Communist Party maintains firm control over all levels of government, and the top party position in each autonomous region is invariably held by a Han Chinese. Economic development policies — including the massive infrastructure projects of the "Western Development" (西部大开发, Xibu Da Kaifa) campaign, launched in 2000 — have brought roads, railways, and investment to minority regions, but have also facilitated Han migration and cultural assimilation. The tension between the official rhetoric of "ethnic equality" and "regional autonomy" and the reality of Han demographic, economic, and political dominance is one of the most persistent contradictions of the PRC's nationality system.

The experiences of different minority groups have varied enormously. The Zhuang of Guangxi, the Manchu of the northeast, and the Hui (Chinese-speaking Muslims) have been relatively well integrated into Chinese society, maintaining elements of ethnic identity while participating fully in the economic and social life of the nation. The Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Mongols — peoples with strong historical traditions of independent or autonomous governance, distinct languages and scripts, and (in the cases of the Tibetans and Uyghurs) religious traditions that set them apart from the Han majority — have experienced more conflict and resistance.

The resistance of minority peoples to Chinese assimilation has taken many forms — from armed rebellion (as in Tibet in 1959 and in Xinjiang on multiple occasions) to cultural preservation (the maintenance of language, religion, and customs in the face of assimilationist pressure) to political activism (including the Tibetan exile movement led by the Dalai Lama and the Uyghur diaspora organizations). The Chinese government's response to this resistance has ranged from accommodation and cultural preservation to severe repression — the extremes of which are represented by the current situation in Xinjiang.

The future of China's minority policies will be shaped by the tension between two imperatives — the desire for national unity and the recognition that the country's ethnic diversity is a reality that cannot be simply wished away. Whether China can develop a model of ethnic relations that genuinely respects diversity while maintaining national cohesion — or whether the current trajectory of assimilation and repression will deepen resentment and resistance — is one of the most important questions facing the Chinese state in the twenty-first century.

10. Conclusion: The Ongoing Construction of "China"

The history of ethnicity, frontier, and identity in China reveals that "China" is not a fixed or natural entity but a historical construction — one that has been continuously shaped and reshaped by conquest, colonization, migration, assimilation, and the political decisions of states and rulers. The "China" of the twenty-first century — a vast, multiethnic state claiming sovereignty over the territory of a Manchu empire — is the product of specific historical processes, not of any natural or inevitable logic.

This does not mean that the modern Chinese state is illegitimate — all states are historical constructions, and the fact that China's borders and identity are the products of history does not make them less real or less valid than those of any other country. But it does mean that claims to sovereignty and national unity based on assertions of timeless, essential "Chineseness" are historically untenable — and that the rights, identities, and aspirations of the diverse peoples who live within China's borders deserve recognition and respect.

The making of "China" is not finished. The relationships between the Han majority and the minority nationalities, between the center and the frontiers, between the state's claims to unity and the reality of diversity, will continue to evolve — shaped by economic development, demographic change, political decisions, and the aspirations of hundreds of millions of people whose identities are complex, multiple, and irreducible to any single category. Understanding the history of these relationships — in all their complexity and contingency — is essential to understanding the China of today and the China that is yet to come.