History of Chinese Culture/Chapter 27

Previous◀ Chapter 26

History of Chinese Culture

NextChapter 28 ▶

Chapter 27: The Question of Cultural Identity — Continuity, Rupture, and Reinvention

1. Introduction: What Makes Chinese Culture "Chinese"?

What is Chinese culture? The question appears simple, yet it is one of the most complex and contested questions in the study of civilization. Chinese culture is often described as the world's longest continuous cultural tradition — a civilization that has maintained recognizable continuity of language, writing, social values, and political forms for more than three thousand years. Yet this continuity is also, in many respects, an illusion — or, more precisely, a construction. Chinese culture has been repeatedly disrupted, transformed, and reinvented over the course of its long history: by foreign conquest, by internal revolution, by religious conversion, by encounter with alien civilizations, and by the deliberate efforts of political leaders and intellectual elites to reshape the cultural tradition in accordance with their own visions. The question of what constitutes the essential core of Chinese culture — and whether such a core exists at all — has been one of the central preoccupations of Chinese intellectual life since the late nineteenth century, when the encounter with Western civilization forced Chinese thinkers to ask, for the first time in a systematic way, what it meant to be Chinese.

This chapter examines the history of the debate over Chinese cultural identity — from the ancient concept of "Chineseness" (华夏, Huaxia) to the modern controversies over "national essence" (国粹, guocui), "Chinese characteristics" (中国特色, Zhongguo tese), and the relationship between tradition and modernity in contemporary Chinese culture.

2. Ancient Conceptions of Chineseness

The concept of a distinctive Chinese cultural identity — the idea that there is a defined community of people who share a common culture that distinguishes them from "barbarians" (蛮夷, manyi) — is very ancient, traceable at least to the Western Zhou period (1046–771 BCE). The term Huaxia (华夏) — which originally referred to the people of the Central Plain who shared a common set of ritual practices, political allegiances, and cultural norms — became the foundational term for Chinese cultural identity, and it remains embedded in the modern Chinese word for China: Zhonghua (中华, literally "Central Hua") or Huaren (华人, "Hua people").

The ancient concept of Chineseness was defined primarily by culture rather than by race or ethnicity. The distinction between Chinese and "barbarian" was understood as a distinction between civilized and uncivilized — between those who observed the rites (礼, li), practiced agriculture, wore proper clothing, and submitted to the authority of the Son of Heaven, and those who did not. The Confucian philosopher Mencius articulated this cultural definition with characteristic clarity: "I have heard of the Chinese transforming barbarians, but I have never heard of barbarians transforming the Chinese" — a statement that expressed confidence in the superiority and transformative power of Chinese civilization while simultaneously acknowledging that cultural identity was a matter of practice rather than birth. The implication was that anyone — regardless of ethnic origin — who adopted Chinese cultural practices could become Chinese, and this principle of cultural assimilation has been fundamental to the expansion and persistence of Chinese civilization.

This cultural definition of Chineseness enabled the Chinese cultural tradition to absorb successive waves of foreign conquest without losing its identity. The Mongol conquest of the thirteenth century and the Manchu conquest of the seventeenth century — both of which brought non-Chinese peoples to power over the Chinese world — did not destroy Chinese culture but were ultimately absorbed by it: the Mongol Yuan dynasty adopted Chinese administrative practices and cultural forms, and the Manchu Qing dynasty became the most ardent patron and preserver of Chinese classical culture, commissioning the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries (四库全书, Siku Quanshu) — the largest compilation of books in Chinese history.

3. The Crisis of Cultural Identity in the Modern Era

The modern crisis of Chinese cultural identity began in the mid-nineteenth century, when China's military defeats at the hands of Western powers shattered the traditional assumption of Chinese cultural superiority and forced Chinese intellectuals to confront the possibility that Chinese civilization was, in some fundamental respects, inferior to the civilization of the West. This realization — traumatic, disorienting, and profoundly consequential — set in motion a debate over the nature and value of Chinese culture that has continued, in various forms, to the present day.

The earliest modern responses to the crisis of cultural identity attempted to preserve the core of Chinese culture while adopting Western technology and institutions. The Self-Strengthening Movement's formula — "Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for practical application" (中学为体，西学为用) — proposed a neat distinction between the unchanging "essence" of Chinese culture (understood as Confucian moral philosophy and social values) and the "practical" knowledge of Western science and technology that could be adopted without disturbing the cultural core. This formula proved untenable: the attempt to borrow Western technology without adopting Western institutional and intellectual frameworks consistently failed, and the defeats of the Sino-Japanese War (1895) and the Boxer Uprising (1900) discredited the Self-Strengthening approach.

The guocui (国粹, "national essence") movement of the early twentieth century represented a more sophisticated attempt to define and preserve the essential core of Chinese culture in the face of Western encroachment. Scholars such as Zhang Taiyan (章太炎, 1869–1936) and Liu Shipei (刘师培, 1884–1919) argued that Chinese civilization possessed a distinctive "national essence" — embodied in its classical literature, historical traditions, and philosophical thought — that must be preserved and defended against the indiscriminate adoption of Western culture. The guocui scholars emphasized the study of Chinese philology, history, and antiquity as means of recovering and revitalizing the cultural heritage, and they established journals and societies devoted to the preservation of "national learning" (国学, guoxue).

4. The May Fourth Assault on Tradition

The most radical response to the crisis of Chinese cultural identity was the May Fourth Movement (五四运动, Wusi Yundong) of 1919 and the associated "New Culture Movement" (新文化运动, Xin Wenhua Yundong) — a comprehensive intellectual and cultural revolt against the Chinese tradition that was, in its scope and intensity, one of the most extraordinary episodes of cultural self-criticism in human history. May Fourth intellectuals argued that the root cause of China's weakness and backwardness was not merely technological deficiency but the cultural tradition itself — the Confucian values of hierarchy, obedience, and filial piety that, in their view, had produced a servile and stagnant society incapable of competing with the dynamic and progressive civilization of the West.

The leading voices of the May Fourth Movement — Chen Duxiu (陈独秀, 1879–1942), the founder of the journal New Youth (新青年, Xin Qingnian); Hu Shi (胡适, 1891–1962), the advocate of vernacular literature and pragmatist philosophy; and Lu Xun (鲁迅, 1881–1936), the great writer whose stories anatomized the pathologies of Chinese culture — called for a wholesale rejection of the "old culture" and its replacement by "new culture" based on science, democracy, individual freedom, and vernacular literature. Lu Xun's devastating short stories — particularly "A Madman's Diary" (狂人日记, Kuangren Riji, 1918) and "The True Story of Ah Q" (阿Q正传, A Q Zhengzhuan, 1921) — portrayed Chinese traditional culture as a system of "man-eating" (吃人, chiren) oppression that must be destroyed root and branch.

The May Fourth assault on tradition was simultaneously an act of cultural destruction and cultural creation. The replacement of classical Chinese (文言文, wenyanwen) with the vernacular (白话文, baihuawen) as the medium of serious writing was one of the most consequential cultural transformations in Chinese history — comparable in its effects to the transition from Latin to vernacular languages in Renaissance Europe. The introduction of Western literary forms — the modern short story, the novel, drama, and free-verse poetry — created an entirely new Chinese literary culture that drew on both Chinese and Western traditions.

Yet the May Fourth Movement also generated a powerful counter-reaction from those who believed that the wholesale rejection of Chinese tradition was both intellectually misguided and culturally destructive. The "New Confucians" (新儒家, Xin Rujia) — scholars such as Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, 1893–1988), Xiong Shili (熊十力, 1885–1968), and Feng Youlan (冯友兰, 1895–1990) — argued that Confucian philosophy contained resources of enduring value that were compatible with modernity and that could contribute to the creation of a modern Chinese culture that was neither a slavish imitation of the West nor a nostalgic return to the past. The "New Confucian" movement — which continued through the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, with significant figures including Tang Junyi (唐君毅, 1909–1978), Mou Zongsan (牟宗三, 1909–1995), and Tu Weiming (杜维明, b. 1940) — argued that the Confucian tradition possessed philosophical resources that were not only compatible with modernity but essential for addressing the spiritual and moral crises of modern civilization. This position — that Chinese cultural tradition is not an obstacle to modernity but a resource for enriching it — has become increasingly influential in the twenty-first century.

5. Communist Revolution and Traditional Culture

The Chinese Communist revolution — from its beginnings in the 1920s through the founding of the People's Republic in 1949 and the tumultuous decades that followed — represented the most radical and most violent assault on traditional Chinese culture in history. The Communist Party, guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, regarded traditional Chinese culture as the ideological superstructure of feudal class society — a system of beliefs, values, and practices that served the interests of the ruling classes and oppressed the laboring masses. The revolutionary program called for the systematic destruction of the "four olds" (四旧, sijiu) — old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas — and their replacement by a new socialist culture.

The Cultural Revolution (文化大革命, Wenhua Da Geming, 1966–1976) brought this assault to its most extreme expression. Red Guards attacked temples, shrines, ancestral halls, and cultural monuments; destroyed artworks, manuscripts, and rare books; and persecuted scholars, artists, and anyone associated with traditional culture. The destruction was immense: thousands of temples, shrines, and historical buildings were damaged or destroyed; countless works of art and literature were lost; and an entire generation was cut off from its cultural heritage. The Cultural Revolution represented the most deliberate and systematic attempt to sever a civilization from its cultural past in modern history.

Yet the relationship between the Communist revolution and Chinese cultural tradition was more complex than a simple narrative of destruction would suggest. Mao Zedong (毛泽东, 1893–1976) was himself a product of the Chinese literary tradition — a poet of genuine talent who wrote in the classical style, a strategist who drew on the tradition of Chinese military thought, and a political leader whose cult of personality drew on the traditional reverence for the emperor. The revolutionary culture that Mao created — with its emphasis on moral self-cultivation, collective virtue, and the subordination of the individual to the community — bore striking structural similarities to the Confucian tradition it claimed to have superseded.

6. Post-Mao Revival and the "Culture Fever"

The death of Mao Zedong in 1976 and the inauguration of the reform era under Deng Xiaoping initiated a dramatic reassessment of China's cultural heritage. The "culture fever" (文化热, wenhua re) of the 1980s — a period of intense intellectual and cultural ferment — saw Chinese intellectuals engaging in a wide-ranging debate over the nature and value of Chinese cultural tradition, the reasons for China's "backwardness," and the path toward cultural modernity. The debate ranged from the radically iconoclastic — the television documentary series Heshang (河殇, River Elegy, 1988), which portrayed Chinese civilization as a stagnant, landlocked "yellow civilization" that must be swept away by the dynamic "blue civilization" of the maritime West — to the conservatively restorationist, with calls for a return to Confucian values as the foundation of Chinese cultural identity.

The 1990s and 2000s saw a remarkable revival of interest in traditional Chinese culture — a phenomenon that accelerated after the suppression of the 1989 democracy movement and the turn away from Western-style liberalism. The revival took many forms: the restoration of temples and historical monuments, the promotion of traditional festivals, the establishment of Confucius Institutes worldwide, the popularity of television programs and books about Chinese history and classical culture, and the emergence of a "national studies craze" (国学热, guoxue re) that saw millions of Chinese people — including businesspeople, officials, and ordinary citizens — studying the Confucian classics, practicing calligraphy, and rediscovering traditional arts.

The Chinese government has actively promoted the revival of traditional culture as a source of national identity and social cohesion. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly invoked the "excellent traditional culture of China" (中华优秀传统文化, Zhonghua youxiu chuantong wenhua) as a foundation of national governance and social values, and the government has sponsored major programs for the preservation, study, and promotion of Chinese cultural heritage. Confucius — once denounced as a "class enemy" during the Cultural Revolution — has been rehabilitated as a symbol of Chinese cultural excellence, and the Chinese government has used Confucian concepts such as "harmony" (和谐, hexie) and "benevolence" (仁, ren) as foundations of its domestic and international rhetoric.

7. Nationalism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Question of "Chinese Characteristics"

The relationship between Chinese cultural identity and the wider world remains one of the most contentious and consequential questions in contemporary Chinese intellectual life. The concept of "Chinese characteristics" (中国特色, Zhongguo tese) — used by the Chinese government since the 1980s to describe the distinctiveness of China's path of development ("socialism with Chinese characteristics," 中国特色社会主义, Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi) — has become a central category of Chinese political and cultural discourse. The concept asserts that China's historical experience, cultural traditions, and social conditions are sufficiently distinctive to require a path of development that differs fundamentally from Western models — a claim that serves simultaneously as a defense of the Chinese political system and as an assertion of cultural distinctiveness.

Chinese nationalism (民族主义, minzu zhuyi) — which has grown significantly in intensity since the 1990s, fueled by economic success, historical grievances (particularly the memory of the "century of humiliation," 百年国耻, bainian guochi), and the government's patriotic education campaign — draws heavily on the sense of Chinese cultural distinctiveness. Nationalist sentiment has been expressed in phenomena ranging from the revival of traditional culture to the assertion of territorial claims in the South China Sea, and it has generated both pride in Chinese civilizational achievement and resentment of perceived Western condescension and interference.

At the same time, China remains deeply engaged with global culture. Millions of Chinese students study abroad, Chinese consumers eagerly adopt global brands and cultural products, Chinese artists and writers participate in global cultural networks, and Chinese technology companies operate on a global scale. The tension between nationalist assertion and cosmopolitan openness — between the desire to affirm Chinese cultural distinctiveness and the recognition that China's future is inextricably bound up with the wider world — is one of the defining tensions of contemporary Chinese culture.

The concept of the "China Dream" (中国梦, Zhongguo Meng) — articulated by President Xi Jinping in 2012 and since promoted as a central element of Chinese political and cultural discourse — encapsulates this tension. The China Dream is simultaneously a nationalist vision — the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" (中华民族伟大复兴, Zhonghua Minzu weida fuxing) — and a universalist one, promising prosperity, happiness, and dignity for all Chinese people. The concept draws on deep wells of Chinese historical memory — the contrast between the splendor of imperial China and the humiliations of the modern era — while projecting a vision of future greatness that is calibrated to inspire both domestic pride and international respect. Whether the China Dream ultimately proves compatible with the aspirations of other nations and other cultures — whether it is a vision of Chinese greatness within a pluralistic world order or a vision of Chinese preeminence that challenges the existing international system — remains one of the most consequential open questions of the twenty-first century.

8. The Diaspora and Global Chineseness

The question of Chinese cultural identity is further complicated by the existence of a vast Chinese diaspora — estimated at more than 50 million people — living in communities across Southeast Asia, the Americas, Europe, Oceania, and Africa. Overseas Chinese (华侨, huaqiao) and people of Chinese descent (华裔, huayi) have maintained varying degrees of connection to Chinese language, culture, and identity, creating a global network of Chinese cultural communities that complicate any simple equation of Chinese culture with the Chinese state.

The Chinese communities of Southeast Asia — in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, and elsewhere — have maintained Chinese cultural practices for centuries while simultaneously adapting to local cultures and developing distinctive hybrid identities. Singapore — a majority-Chinese city-state that is officially multilingual and multicultural — represents a particularly interesting case of Chinese cultural identity in a non-Chinese political context. The Chinese communities of the Americas, Europe, and Oceania — shaped by different histories of migration, discrimination, and integration — present still other configurations of Chinese cultural identity.

The diversity of the Chinese diaspora challenges any monolithic conception of Chinese culture and reminds us that Chinese cultural identity is not a fixed essence but a dynamic and contested process — a process of ongoing negotiation between tradition and innovation, between local and global, between Chinese and non-Chinese elements.

9. Ethnic Minorities and the Boundaries of Chinese Culture

The question of Chinese cultural identity is further complicated by the presence within China's borders of 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities (少数民族, shaoshu minzu) — comprising approximately 8.5% of the total population, or more than 100 million people — whose languages, religions, customs, and cultural traditions differ, in many cases profoundly, from those of the Han majority. The Uyghurs, Tibetans, Mongols, Zhuang, Miao, Yi, and other minority peoples possess rich and distinctive cultural traditions that are simultaneously part of the cultural landscape of the Chinese state and, in many respects, separate from the Han-centered cultural tradition that is typically identified as "Chinese culture."

The relationship between Han Chinese culture and the cultures of China's ethnic minorities has been complex and often fraught. The imperial tradition tended to view minority peoples through the lens of the "civilizing mission" (教化, jiaohua) — the assumption that the spread of Chinese culture to non-Chinese peoples was a benevolent process of cultural uplift. The modern Chinese state has officially embraced a policy of ethnic equality and cultural autonomy, establishing autonomous regions (自治区, zizhiqu), autonomous prefectures (自治州, zizhizhou), and autonomous counties (自治县, zizhixian) for minority populations. In practice, however, the relationship between the state's commitment to minority cultural autonomy and its commitment to national unity has generated significant tensions, particularly in Tibet and Xinjiang, where questions of cultural identity are inextricably entangled with questions of political sovereignty.

The question of whether and how the cultural traditions of China's ethnic minorities should be included in the concept of "Chinese culture" is one of the most sensitive and most important questions in contemporary Chinese cultural politics. An inclusive definition of Chinese culture — one that encompasses the full diversity of cultural traditions within China's borders — would acknowledge the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, the Uyghur literary and musical heritage, the Mongol pastoral culture, the Miao textile traditions, and the countless other cultural achievements of China's minority peoples as integral parts of the Chinese cultural heritage. A more restrictive definition — one that identifies "Chinese culture" primarily with the Han tradition — would relegate minority cultures to a subordinate or peripheral status. The resolution of this question has profound implications not only for cultural policy but for the political unity and social cohesion of the Chinese state.

10. Conclusion: Continuity, Rupture, and the Ongoing Work of Cultural Creation

The question of Chinese cultural identity — what makes Chinese culture "Chinese" — has no simple answer. Chinese culture is not a fixed and unchanging essence but a living and dynamic tradition that has been continuously created, contested, and transformed over more than three thousand years. The continuity of Chinese culture is real — the Chinese writing system, the Confucian ethical tradition, the family as the fundamental social unit, the reverence for learning, the emphasis on social harmony — but this continuity has been maintained not through passive preservation but through active reinvention, as each generation has reinterpreted and reformulated the cultural tradition in response to new challenges and new circumstances.

The ruptures of Chinese cultural history — the Buddhist transformation, the Mongol and Manchu conquests, the Western impact, the Communist revolution, and the market reforms of the post-Mao era — have been profound, but they have not destroyed the cultural tradition; rather, they have enriched and complicated it, adding new layers of meaning and new dimensions of experience to an already extraordinarily complex cultural heritage. The question of Chinese cultural identity is not a question that will ever be definitively answered; it is, rather, a question that each generation of Chinese people must engage anew — drawing on the resources of the past, responding to the challenges of the present, and imagining the possibilities of the future.