History of Chinese Literature/Chapter 5
Chapter 5: The Hundred Schools — Philosophy as Literature (诸子百家, ca. 550–221 BCE)
1. Introduction: When Philosophy Was Literature
The Warring States period (战国, 475–221 BCE) was the most creative epoch in the history of Chinese thought. In less than three centuries, a remarkable constellation of thinkers — later collectively known as the "Hundred Schools of Thought" (诸子百家, zhuzi baijia) — produced the foundational texts of Chinese philosophy, ethics, political theory, and social thought. These texts — the Lunyu (论语, Analects), the Mengzi (孟子, Mencius), the Zhuangzi (庄子), the Laozi (老子) or Daodejing (道德经), the Xunzi (荀子), the Han Feizi (韩非子), the Mozi (墨子), and many others — are the intellectual bedrock of Chinese civilization, the texts to which Chinese thinkers have returned, generation after generation, for over two thousand years.
But these texts are not merely philosophical treatises. They are also works of literature — and, in several cases, works of extraordinary literary power. The philosophical masters of the Warring States did not distinguish between philosophy and literature in the way that post-Aristotelian Western thought has typically done. They did not write systematic treatises in the manner of Aristotle's Metaphysics or Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Instead, they employed a rich variety of literary forms — dialogue, parable, anecdote, aphorism, allegory, argument, satire, and narrative — to convey their ideas. The result is a body of philosophical prose that is simultaneously a body of literary prose, and that has exerted a profound influence on every subsequent period of Chinese literary history.[1]
This chapter examines the major philosophical texts of the Warring States period as literary works. It considers the literary forms and rhetorical strategies employed by the various schools; the relationship between philosophical content and literary expression; and the place of these texts in the broader history of Chinese literature. It also places the Chinese philosophical tradition in comparative perspective, examining the parallels and differences between the Chinese "axial age" and the roughly contemporaneous flowering of philosophical thought in Greece, India, and the Near East.
2. The Axial Age in Comparative Perspective
In 1949, the German philosopher Karl Jaspers (1883–1969) proposed the concept of the "Axial Age" (Achsenzeit) to describe a period between approximately 800 and 200 BCE during which, in several widely separated regions of the world, human thought underwent a revolutionary transformation. In China, Greece, India, and the Near East, thinkers began for the first time to subject the inherited religious and social traditions of their societies to critical rational examination, to formulate universal ethical principles, to ask fundamental questions about the nature of reality and the good life, and to produce the foundational texts of what would become the great philosophical and religious traditions of the world.[2]
In China, the Axial Age coincides with the late Spring and Autumn (春秋, 770–476 BCE) and Warring States periods — an era of political fragmentation, social upheaval, and intense interstate competition. The Zhou feudal order was collapsing; the old aristocratic families were losing power to new men of talent and ambition; warfare was becoming more frequent, more destructive, and more total; and the bonds of ritual and custom that had held society together were visibly dissolving. It was in this context of crisis and transformation that the Hundred Schools arose — each offering its own diagnosis of what had gone wrong and its own prescription for restoring order.
The parallels with ancient Greece are striking. The Greek philosophical tradition also arose in a context of political fragmentation (the independent city-states), social upheaval (the transition from aristocratic to democratic governance), and cultural contact with foreign civilizations (Egypt, Persia). Both traditions produced a remarkable diversity of competing schools; both valued argument, debate, and persuasion as essential intellectual activities; and both created literary forms — the dialogue, the treatise, the aphorism — that would shape philosophical writing for millennia. The differences are equally important: the Chinese philosophical tradition was more consistently concerned with practical ethics and political governance than with metaphysics and epistemology; it relied more heavily on parable and analogy than on formal logic; and it assumed a fundamentally different relationship between the individual and the community.[3]
3. The Analects: The Art of the Fragment
The Lunyu (论语, Analects) — the record of the sayings and conversations of Confucius (孔子, Kong Qiu 孔丘, 551–479 BCE) compiled by his disciples and their successors — is the most influential book in Chinese history. It is also one of the most distinctive in its literary form. The Lunyu is not a treatise, not a dialogue in the Platonic sense, not a narrative, and not a systematic exposition of doctrine. It is a collection of fragments — brief sayings, short conversations, laconic anecdotes — arranged with no discernible logical or chronological order. Each passage is typically introduced by the formula Zi yue (子曰, "The Master said"), and most are no longer than a few sentences.
This fragmentary form is not a deficiency but a deliberate literary and philosophical strategy. By refusing systematic exposition, the Lunyu enacts the very qualities that Confucius valued most: modesty, suggestiveness, openness to interpretation, and respect for the intelligence of the reader. Each saying is like a seed — compact, dense with meaning, capable of generating an endless variety of interpretations depending on the context in which it is read. The apparent simplicity of the language conceals a depth of implication that rewards repeated reading:
The Master said: "To learn and at due times to practice what one has learned — is that not a pleasure? To have friends come from far away — is that not a joy? Not to be resentful when others fail to appreciate you — is that not the mark of a gentleman?"[4]
This opening passage of the Lunyu — one of the most famous sentences in Chinese literature — establishes the tone and method of the entire work: serene, understated, concerned with the ordinary activities of learning and friendship, yet pointing toward a vision of human excellence that is anything but ordinary.
The literary power of the Lunyu lies in its compression, its concreteness, and its humanity. Confucius emerges from the text not as an abstract philosopher but as a vividly realized individual — a man who loved music and ritual, who was fussy about food and clothing, who grieved deeply for his deceased disciples, who could be witty, irritable, self-deprecating, and passionately earnest by turns. The famous passage in which Confucius asks each of his disciples to describe his ideal and then, when the modest Zeng Xi (曾皙) says he would like simply to bathe in the Yi River, enjoy the breeze at the Rain Altar, and return home singing, sighs and says "I am with Dian [Zeng Xi]!" is one of the most humanly appealing moments in ancient literature — a philosopher choosing spontaneous joy over systematic ambition.[5]
The comparison with Plato's dialogues is instructive. Both the Lunyu and the Platonic dialogues present philosophy as conversation rather than system; both create a vivid literary portrait of a philosopher-teacher; and both use the master-disciple relationship as the primary vehicle for philosophical inquiry. But while Plato constructed elaborate dramatic dialogues — complete with settings, dramatic personae, and extended arguments — Confucius's disciples recorded only fragments, creating a text that is radically open, inviting the reader to supply the connections and contexts that the text itself withholds.
4. Mencius: The Philosopher as Debater
The Mengzi (孟子, Mencius) records the conversations and debates of Mencius (孟子, Meng Ke 孟轲, ca. 372–289 BCE), the most important Confucian thinker after Confucius himself. Where the Lunyu is fragmentary and suggestive, the Mengzi is expansive and argumentative. Mencius was a formidable debater, and the text that bears his name preserves extended dialogues in which he argues with rival philosophers, challenges powerful rulers, and defends the Confucian vision of human nature and good governance with passionate eloquence.
The literary distinction of the Mengzi lies in its rhetorical brilliance. Mencius was a master of analogy — the ability to illuminate an abstract moral principle through a concrete, vivid, and often startling comparison. His most famous analogy is the parable of the child at the well:
Suppose a man were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He would certainly be moved to compassion — not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the child's parents, not because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this we can see that whoever lacks the heart of compassion is not human.[6]
This passage — with its sudden, dramatic scenario, its systematic elimination of ulterior motives, and its confident leap from particular case to universal principle — exemplifies the rhetorical method that makes the Mengzi one of the most readable and most persuasive works of ancient Chinese prose. Mencius's analogies are not mere illustrations of pre-established arguments; they are the arguments themselves — narrative thought-experiments that compel the reader to recognize moral truths by experiencing them imaginatively.
The Mengzi also contains some of the most politically audacious passages in Chinese literature. Mencius told King Xuan of Qi (齐宣王) that a king who tyrannizes his people forfeits the right to rule and may justly be overthrown — a doctrine of the right of revolution that would be invoked throughout Chinese history. He told King Hui of Liang (梁惠王) that "the people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest" (民为贵,社稷次之,君为轻) — a principle of popular sovereignty that scandalized later imperial commentators.[7]
5. The Zhuangzi: Philosophical Literature Par Excellence
If the Lunyu is the most influential Chinese philosophical text and the Mengzi the most rhetorically brilliant, the Zhuangzi (庄子) is the most purely literary. Attributed to Zhuang Zhou (庄周, ca. 369–286 BCE) — though the text as we have it is clearly the work of multiple hands — the Zhuangzi is a work of such imaginative exuberance, such stylistic virtuosity, and such philosophical profundity that it stands as one of the supreme achievements of Chinese literature in any genre.
The Zhuangzi as it survives today consists of thirty-three chapters, divided by the commentator Guo Xiang (郭象, d. 312 CE) into three sections: the "Inner Chapters" (内篇, neipian, chapters 1–7), which are generally attributed to Zhuangzi himself; the "Outer Chapters" (外篇, waipian, chapters 8–22); and the "Miscellaneous Chapters" (杂篇, zapian, chapters 23–33). The Inner Chapters contain the most celebrated passages and display the most consistent philosophical vision; the Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters include material from various hands and periods, some of it brilliant, some of it pedestrian.[8]
The literary method of the Zhuangzi is radically different from that of any other Chinese philosophical text. Where Confucius teaches through aphorism and example, and Mencius through debate and analogy, Zhuangzi teaches through story, fantasy, paradox, and the systematic subversion of all fixed categories and conventional certainties. The Zhuangzi opens with one of the most famous passages in Chinese literature:
In the northern darkness there is a fish called Kun. The Kun is so huge I don't know how many thousand li it measures. It changes and becomes a bird called Peng. The back of the Peng measures I don't know how many thousand li across, and when it rises up and flies off, its wings are like clouds all over the sky. When the sea begins to move, this bird sets off for the southern darkness, which is the Lake of Heaven.[9]
This image of the colossal Peng bird — a creature so vast that it transcends ordinary perception — establishes the central theme of the Zhuangzi: the relativity of all perspectives, the limitation of all human knowledge, and the possibility of a freedom that transcends all conventional distinctions between large and small, noble and base, life and death, self and other. The opening chapter, "Xiaoyao you" (逍遥游, "Free and Easy Wandering"), proceeds through a dazzling sequence of parables and thought-experiments — the tiny quail that mocks the Peng bird, the mushroom that knows nothing of spring and autumn, the cicada that laughs at the great tree — all designed to shake the reader loose from the assumption that his or her own perspective is the only valid one.
The most philosophically celebrated passage in the Zhuangzi is the "butterfly dream":
Once Zhuang Zhou dreamt he was a butterfly, a butterfly flitting and fluttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didn't know he was Zhuang Zhou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Zhuang Zhou. But he didn't know if he was Zhuang Zhou who had dreamt he was a butterfly, or a butterfly dreaming he was Zhuang Zhou.[10]
This passage — which has been compared to Descartes's dream argument, Berkeley's idealism, and various Buddhist and Hindu explorations of the nature of reality — is remarkable not only for its philosophical content but for its literary form. The paradox is presented not as an abstract proposition but as a concrete, sensuous experience: we see the butterfly flitting, we feel the dreamer's confusion upon waking, we share the vertiginous uncertainty of the conclusion. Philosophy and literature are here completely fused; the idea and its expression are inseparable.
The Zhuangzi is also a great work of humor — a quality rare in ancient Chinese philosophical writing. Zhuangzi delights in deflating pomposity, mocking conventionality, and finding wisdom in unexpected places. In one famous passage, he conducts a philosophical dialogue with a skull he finds by the roadside. In another, he celebrates the skill of a cook who has butchered oxen for nineteen years without dulling his blade — a parable of effortless mastery (无为, wuwei) that applies equally to cooking, governing, and living. In yet another, he responds to the death of his wife by sitting with his legs sprawled out, banging on a tub and singing — not from callousness, he explains, but from a philosophical acceptance of the naturalness of death.[11]
The influence of the Zhuangzi on Chinese literature has been immeasurable. Its prose style — at once colloquial and elevated, playful and profound, concrete and visionary — became the model for a tradition of "literary Chinese" (文言, wenyan) that valued spontaneity, wit, and imaginative freedom over formal regularity and ornamental elaboration. Its philosophical vision — the relativity of perspectives, the fluidity of identity, the naturalness of change and death — became one of the essential resources of Chinese poetry, informing the work of Tao Qian (陶潜, 365–427), Li Bai (李白, 701–762), Su Shi (苏轼, 1037–1101), and countless others. Its stories and images — the Peng bird, the butterfly dream, the cook's knife, the useless tree, the happy fish — became part of the common cultural vocabulary of educated Chinese, quoted and alluded to in every era and every genre.
6. The Laozi: The Power of Paradox
The Laozi (老子), also known as the Daodejing (道德经, Classic of the Way and Its Power), is the most enigmatic and the most widely translated of all Chinese philosophical texts. Traditionally attributed to a sage named Laozi (老子, "Old Master"), who was supposedly an older contemporary of Confucius, the text as we have it is almost certainly a composite work, assembled over a period of several centuries and reaching approximately its present form by the third century BCE. The discovery of two manuscript versions of the Laozi at Mawangdui (马王堆) in 1973 and a bamboo-strip version at Guodian (郭店) in 1993 has shed new light on the text's history, but many questions remain unresolved.[12]
The Laozi consists of eighty-one short chapters — some only a few lines long — written in a style that is at once aphoristic, paradoxical, and poetic. Its central concept is the Dao (道, "Way") — the underlying principle or pattern of the natural world, which is nameless, formless, and beyond the reach of language and conceptual thought:
The Way that can be told of is not the constant Way;
The name that can be named is not the constant name.
The nameless is the beginning of heaven and earth;
The named is the mother of the myriad creatures.[13]
The literary power of the Laozi lies in its paradoxes. The text systematically inverts the conventional values of Confucian culture — strength, knowledge, action, speech — and affirms their opposites: weakness, ignorance, inaction (无为, wuwei), silence. "The softest thing in the universe overcomes the hardest thing" (ch. 43). "He who knows does not speak; he who speaks does not know" (ch. 56). "The Way is like water — it benefits the ten thousand things without competing with them" (ch. 8). These paradoxes are not merely rhetorical devices; they enact the fundamental Daoist insight that the conventional categories of human thought — good/bad, strong/weak, useful/useless — are arbitrary constructions that obscure the deeper unity and flow of the natural world.
The Laozi is also a political text — indeed, one of the most radical political texts in the Chinese tradition. It advocates a style of governance based on wuwei (non-action or effortless action): the ideal ruler is one who governs so unobtrusively that the people scarcely know he exists. "The best ruler is one whose existence the people are barely aware of. The next best is one who is loved and praised. Next is one who is feared. And worst is one who is despised" (ch. 17). This vision of minimal government — in which the ruler empties himself of desires, knowledge, and ambition, and allows the people to live according to their own natural inclinations — stands in sharp contrast to the activist, interventionist, morally didactic model of governance advocated by Confucius and Mencius.[14]
As a literary text, the Laozi has had an enormous influence on Chinese poetry and prose. Its compressed, imagistic, paradoxical style — so different from the expansive rhetoric of the Mengzi or the playful storytelling of the Zhuangzi — established a tradition of philosophical poetry that would reach its fullest expression in the works of the Six Dynasties xuanyan shi (玄言诗, "metaphysical poetry") and the nature poetry of Tao Qian and Wang Wei (王维, 701–761).
7. Xunzi: The Master of Argumentative Prose
Xunzi (荀子, Xun Kuang 荀况, ca. 310–235 BCE) is the most systematic and most argumentatively rigorous of the Confucian thinkers, and the Xunzi — the collection of essays attributed to him — represents a decisive advance in the art of Chinese philosophical prose. Where the Lunyu consists of fragments and the Mengzi of debates, the Xunzi consists of sustained, well-organized essays on specific topics: "Encouraging Learning" (劝学, Quanxue), "The Rectification of Names" (正名, Zhengming), "A Discussion of Ritual" (礼论, Lilun), "A Discussion of Music" (乐论, Yuelun), and the famous "Human Nature Is Evil" (性恶, Xing'e).
The literary significance of the Xunzi lies in its development of the lun (论, "essay" or "discourse") as a literary form. Each chapter of the Xunzi presents a clear thesis, supports it with arguments and evidence, considers and refutes objections, and arrives at a definitive conclusion. This structure — thesis, argument, refutation, conclusion — is closer to the Western essay tradition (Aristotle, Cicero, Montaigne) than anything else in ancient Chinese literature. Xunzi's prose style is correspondingly clear, precise, and logical — qualities that reflect his philosophical conviction that clarity of language and thought are essential to good governance and moral cultivation.[15]
The opening of "Encouraging Learning" — one of the most anthologized passages in Chinese literature — illustrates Xunzi's method:
Learning should never cease. Blue comes from the indigo plant but is bluer than indigo; ice comes from water but is colder than water. A piece of wood straight as a plumb line may be bent into a wheel that is round as a compass. Even after it has dried, it will not straighten again, because the bending has made it so. Thus wood marked by a chalk line will become straight, and metal ground with a whetstone will become sharp. The gentleman who studies widely and examines himself daily will be clear in his understanding and faultless in his conduct.[16]
The cascading analogies — blue and indigo, ice and water, wood and wheel, blade and whetstone — build a cumulative argument for the transformative power of learning that is at once logically compelling and aesthetically satisfying.
Xunzi's most controversial and most literarily productive thesis is his assertion that "human nature is evil" (性恶, xing'e) — a direct challenge to Mencius's doctrine that human nature is good (性善, xing shan). Xunzi argued that human beings are born with selfish desires that, if left unchecked, lead to conflict and disorder; it is only through the civilizing influence of ritual (礼, li), education, and moral effort that these raw desires are transformed into the virtues of the gentleman. This debate between Mencius and Xunzi — between moral optimism and moral realism, between the belief that virtue is innate and the belief that it must be cultivated — is one of the great intellectual debates in Chinese history, and it generated a tradition of philosophical essay-writing that continued throughout the imperial period.
8. Han Feizi: The Literature of Power
The Han Feizi (韩非子) is the masterwork of the Legalist school (法家, fajia) and one of the most brilliantly written prose works of the Warring States period. Its author, Han Fei (韩非, ca. 280–233 BCE), was a prince of the state of Han and a student of Xunzi. He synthesized the ideas of the earlier Legalists — Shang Yang (商鞅, d. 338 BCE), Shen Buhai (申不害, d. 337 BCE), and Shen Dao (慎到, ca. 350–275 BCE) — into a comprehensive theory of statecraft based on law (法, fa), technique (术, shu), and positional power (势, shi).
The literary power of the Han Feizi lies in its ruthless clarity and its devastating use of historical anecdote. Han Fei was not interested in moral exhortation or philosophical speculation; he was interested in power — in the concrete mechanisms by which a ruler could maintain control over his ministers, his army, and his people. His prose is correspondingly spare, direct, and unsentimental. He analyzed political situations with the cold precision of a surgeon, stripping away the Confucian rhetoric of benevolence and righteousness to reveal the underlying dynamics of self-interest and coercion.
Han Fei was also a master of the illustrative anecdote — the brief, pointed story that encapsulates a political principle. Many of these anecdotes have become proverbial in Chinese culture. The most famous is the story of the contradictory merchant:
A man of Chu was selling shields and spears. He praised his shields, saying: "My shields are so solid that nothing can penetrate them." Then he praised his spears, saying: "My spears are so sharp that they can penetrate anything." Someone asked: "What would happen if your spear struck your shield?" The man could not answer.[17]
This anecdote is the origin of the Chinese word maodun (矛盾, "spear-shield," i.e. "contradiction") — a word that entered ordinary Chinese vocabulary from the pages of the Han Feizi and that was later adopted by Mao Zedong as the title of one of his most important philosophical essays ("On Contradiction," 矛盾论, 1937).
Han Fei's tragic fate adds a dimension of personal pathos to his writings. According to Sima Qian, the First Emperor of Qin (秦始皇) admired Han Fei's writings so much that he waged war on the state of Han partly to obtain Han Fei's services. But when Han Fei arrived at the Qin court, the minister Li Si (李斯, ca. 280–208 BCE) — Han Fei's former fellow student under Xunzi and now his jealous rival — slandered him and had him poisoned in prison. The philosopher of power became the victim of power — a bitter irony that subsequent Chinese commentators were not slow to observe.[18]
9. Mozi: The Logic of Universal Love
The Mozi (墨子) records the teachings of Mo Di (墨翟, ca. 470–391 BCE) and the Mohist school, which was one of the most influential philosophical movements of the Warring States period before being eclipsed by Confucianism and Daoism in the Han dynasty. The Mohists advocated "universal love" (兼爱, jian'ai) — the principle that one should love all people equally, without the Confucian distinctions between degrees of kinship and social relationship — and "condemning aggression" (非攻, feigong). They also made significant contributions to logic, epistemology, optics, and military engineering.
The literary interest of the Mozi lies primarily in its argumentative method. Mo Di and his followers developed a systematic approach to argumentation that was closer to formal logic than anything else in the Chinese philosophical tradition. Arguments were organized around three "tests" (三表, sanbiao): historical precedent (the example of the sage kings), empirical evidence (the testimony of the common people's eyes and ears), and practical utility (whether the principle, if implemented, would benefit the state and the people). This method produced a prose style that was rigorous, systematic, and somewhat austere — admired by later logicians but criticized by literary connoisseurs for its lack of elegance and imagination.[19]
Despite its austere reputation, the Mozi contains passages of considerable rhetorical power, particularly the chapters condemning aggressive warfare. Mo Di's arguments against war — based on logical analogies between individual murder and mass killing — are among the earliest examples of anti-war literature in any tradition and anticipate the arguments of later pacifist thinkers from Erasmus to Gandhi.
10. The Rhetorical Strategies of the Persuaders
One of the most distinctive literary products of the Warring States period was the culture of the "traveling persuaders" (游说之士, youshui zhi shi) — itinerant scholars and strategists who traveled from court to court, offering their services to the rulers of the competing states. These persuaders — figures such as Su Qin (苏秦), Zhang Yi (张仪), Gongsun Long (公孙龙), and Hui Shi (惠施) — were masters of rhetoric, skilled in the arts of argument, flattery, threat, and deception. Their speeches and stratagems are preserved in several collections, most notably the Zhanguo Ce (战国策, Stratagems of the Warring States), which will be discussed in the next chapter.
The culture of persuasion had a profound influence on the literary forms of the philosophical texts. The Warring States philosophers were not cloistered academics writing for posterity; they were active participants in the political life of their time, competing for the attention and patronage of powerful rulers. Their texts bear the marks of this competitive environment: they are argumentative, rhetorically sophisticated, and often polemical. Mencius's dialogues with kings, Han Fei's analyses of political strategy, and even Zhuangzi's parables and paradoxes can all be understood, in part, as bids for attention and influence in a crowded intellectual marketplace.
The most important rhetorical strategy employed by the Warring States philosophers was the use of yu (喻, "analogy" or "parable"). Chinese philosophical argument characteristically proceeds not by syllogistic deduction but by analogical reasoning: a difficult or abstract point is made vivid and compelling by comparing it to a familiar, concrete situation. Mencius's child at the well, Zhuangzi's butterfly dream, Xunzi's indigo and ice, Han Fei's spear and shield — these are all examples of yu, and they are the literary heart of the philosophical texts. The best analogies are not merely illustrative but transformative: they change the way the reader perceives the world, revealing hidden connections and dissolving apparent certainties.[20]
11. The Lushi Chunqiu: The Synthetic Encyclopedia
The Lushi Chunqiu (吕氏春秋, The Annals of Lü Buwei) occupies a unique position in the history of Warring States thought. Compiled around 239 BCE under the patronage of Lü Buwei (吕不韦, d. 235 BCE), the powerful chancellor of the state of Qin, it is a massive compendium that attempts to synthesize the teachings of all the major philosophical schools into a single, comprehensive system. Its 160 chapters, organized according to the twelve months of the year and supplemented by eight "surveys" (览, lan) and six "discourses" (论, lun), cover every conceivable topic: cosmology, agriculture, music, warfare, governance, ethics, natural philosophy, and much more.
The literary interest of the Lushi Chunqiu lies in its encyclopedic ambition and its remarkable collection of anecdotes, parables, and historical narratives. Many famous stories and sayings that have become part of the common cultural heritage of China are preserved here, including the story of the man from Zheng who insisted on buying shoes by measurement rather than trying them on — a parable of rigid adherence to abstract rules at the expense of common sense — and the story of the farmer from Song who pulled up his seedlings to help them grow — a parable of counterproductive impatience that Mencius had also used.[21]
The Lushi Chunqiu represents the culmination and the conclusion of the Hundred Schools period. After the unification of China under the Qin dynasty (221 BCE), the era of free philosophical competition came to an end. The Qin government suppressed rival schools and attempted to establish a monopoly on thought; the succeeding Han dynasty elevated Confucianism to the status of official state ideology. The Lushi Chunqiu, with its attempt to synthesize all schools into a harmonious whole, can be read as the last great monument of an era of intellectual pluralism that would not be fully recaptured until the modern period.
12. Literature Serving Didactic, Persuasive, and Transformative Purposes
A common thread running through all the texts discussed in this chapter is the assumption that literature is not an end in itself but a means to an end. The Warring States philosophers did not write to create beauty, to express personal emotion, or to explore the possibilities of language for its own sake — although their texts often achieve all of these things incidentally. They wrote to teach, to persuade, to transform — to change the way their readers thought and acted in the world.
This instrumental conception of literature — the belief that the primary purpose of writing is moral, political, and educational rather than aesthetic — would become one of the dominant themes of Chinese literary theory. The Confucian tradition, in particular, consistently subordinated aesthetic considerations to ethical ones: a text was valued not for its beauty but for its contribution to moral cultivation and social harmony. The famous Confucian formula wen yi zai dao (文以载道, "literature is the vehicle of the Way") — articulated by the Tang dynasty essayist Han Yu (韩愈, 768–824) and endorsed by the Neo-Confucian thinkers of the Song dynasty — is a direct descendant of the instrumental conception of literature that pervades the philosophical texts of the Warring States period.[22]
And yet the paradox remains: the philosophical texts that most vigorously assert the subordination of literature to philosophy — the texts that most explicitly deny any interest in literary beauty — are often the most literarily accomplished works of the Warring States period. The Zhuangzi, which dismisses language as an inadequate tool for grasping reality, is the most brilliant prose work of ancient China. The Laozi, which advocates silence and non-action, is one of the most eloquent poems in any language. The Lunyu, which values modesty and understatement, has been more widely read and more deeply pondered than any other book in the Chinese tradition. The lesson is clear: in the hands of a great writer, the denial of literary ambition can itself become the highest form of literary art.
13. Conclusion
The philosophical texts of the Warring States period are among the greatest achievements of Chinese civilization and of world literature. They established the intellectual frameworks — Confucian, Daoist, Legalist, Mohist — within which Chinese thinkers would work for the next two millennia. They created the literary forms — the aphorism, the dialogue, the parable, the essay, the paradox — that would shape Chinese prose writing until the modern period. And they demonstrated, with unsurpassed brilliance, that philosophy and literature are not separate domains but aspects of a single activity: the human effort to understand the world and to live well within it.
In the next chapter, we turn from philosophical prose to historical prose — and discover that in China, as in few other civilizations, the writing of history has been understood as a literary art of the highest order.
References
- ↑ A.C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1989), 1–30.
- ↑ Karl Jaspers, The Origin and Goal of History (Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte), trans. Michael Bullock (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), 1–21.
- ↑ Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 1–55.
- ↑ Lunyu 论语, 1.1. Translation adapted from D.C. Lau, trans., The Analects (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), 59.
- ↑ Lunyu 11.26. See Lau, The Analects, 107–108; Edward Slingerland, trans., Confucius: Analerta (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 122–123.
- ↑ Mengzi 孟子, 2A.6. Translation adapted from D.C. Lau, trans., Mencius (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1970), 82–83.
- ↑ Mengzi 7B.14. See Lau, Mencius, 196.
- ↑ A.C. Graham, trans., Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 3–31.
- ↑ Zhuangzi 庄子, ch. 1, "Xiaoyao you" 逍遥游 (Free and Easy Wandering). Translation adapted from Burton Watson, trans., The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29.
- ↑ Zhuangzi ch. 2, "Qi wu lun" 齐物论 (Discussion on Making All Things Equal). Watson, Complete Works, 49.
- ↑ Watson, Complete Works, 191–192; Graham, Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters, 123–124.
- ↑ Robert G. Henricks, trans., Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching: A Translation of the Startling New Documents Found at Guodian (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 1–25.
- ↑ Laozi 老子, ch. 1. Translation adapted from D.C. Lau, trans., Tao Te Ching (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1963), 57.
- ↑ Michael LaFargue, The Tao of the Tao Te Ching (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), 1–40.
- ↑ John Knoblock, trans., Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988–1994), vol. 1, 1–36.
- ↑ Xunzi 荀子, ch. 1, "Quanxue" 劝学. Translation adapted from Knoblock, Xunzi, vol. 1, 135.
- ↑ Han Feizi 韩非子, ch. 40, "Nan yi" 难一. Translation adapted from W.K. Liao, trans., The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1959), vol. 2, 197.
- ↑ Sima Qian, Shiji, ch. 63, "Laozi Han Fei liezhuan." Watson, Records of the Grand Historian: Qin Dynasty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 21–25.
- ↑ Chris Fraser, The Philosophy of the Mòzi: The First Consequentialists (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 1–30.
- ↑ Christoph Harbsmeier, "The Rhetoric of Premodern Chinese Philosophical Argument," in Shadi Bartsch and Jaś Elsner, eds., The Cambridge Companion to the Literature of Classical Greece and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 121–145.
- ↑ John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel, trans., The Annals of Lü Buwei (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 1–52.
- ↑ Stephen Owen, Readings in Chinese Literary Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 1–25.